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The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment provides that no
"person [shall] be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Historically,
the Double Jeopardy Clause has
been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to protect against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal;
a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and
multiple punishment for the same
offense." North Carolinav. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). If a judgment of civil forfeiture following a
criminal prosecution constitutes a
"second prosecution" or "multiple
punishment" for the same offense,
the civil action is barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. (Forfeiture
occurs when a person loses his or
her rights in property as a result of
criminal or quasi-criminal wrongdoing.) The forfeited property, regardless of whether it was used to facilitate the commission of a crime or
constitutes proceeds derived from
illegal activity, must be returned to
the owner.
At the same time, if the government
obtains a judgment of civil forfeiture, double jeopardy may prohibit
the government from subsequently

_'

prosecuting the defendant for the
criminal conduct that gave rise to
forfeiture. The Double Jeopardy
Clause, in effect, immunizes the
defendant from criminal liability.
A federal prosecutor thus faces a
serious dilemma. If the government
initiates a civil forfeiture proceeding
and wins a judgment of forfeiture,
the government may ultimately lose
because the Double Jeopardy Clause
may bar any subsequent criminal
prosecution based on the same
offense. Conversely, if the prosecutor proceeds by filing criminal
charges against the defendant,
any later attempt to forfeit tainted
property may be foreclosed,
enabling the defendant to retain
his ill-gotten gains.
The federal circuits have struggled
with the double jeopardy issue.
Divergent views have emerged
resulting in disparate application of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
(Continued on Page 326)
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One of the most divisive
and vexing issues confronting the federal
courts today is a whether

L,

criminal prosecution and
a civil forfeiture action
filed in separate proceedings but based on the
same offense constitute a

%,'/

violation of the Double
"
0

,2,

Jeopardy Clause. The
federal circuits remain
deeply divided on the
issue, and the Supreme
Court's ultimate resolution of the matter is certain to have far-reaching
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legal consequences.
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Whether the defendant is afforded
protection from criminal prosecution or allowed to retain tainted
property may depend on the nature
of the property sought to be forfeited. Several federal circuits have
concluded that forfeiture of proceeds of illegal activity is a remedial
sanction, not punishment, and thus
does not offend double jeopardy.
See United States v. Tiley, 18 F.3d
295 (5th Cir. 1994); United States
v. $184,505.01 in United States
Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir.
1995); United States v. Salinas,
65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 1995); Smith v.
United States, 1996 WL 7258, at 3
(7th Cir. 1996); SEC v. Bilzerian,
29 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
This view, however, has not been
unanimously embraced by the
federal courts as can be seen from
the appellate court opinions in
these consolidated cases. See also
United States v. 9844 South Titan
Court, 1996 WL 49002, at 15
(10th Cir. 1996).
Whether separate criminal and civil
forfeiture proceedings violate double
jeopardy also could depend on
whether the two proceedings were
pursued concurrently, in which case
they may be characterized as a
"single, coordinated proceeding."
United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17,
18 (2d Cir. 1993); accord United
States v. 18755 North Bay Road,
13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Smith, 1996
WL 34552, at 4 (8th Cir. 1996).
Since the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prohibit multiple punishment in the same proceeding, the
imposition of criminal and civil
sanctions is lawful. However,
the Ninth Circuit rejected this
approach, 33 F.3d at 1218, as has
the Tenth Circuit, United States v.
9844 South Titan Court, 1996
WL 49002, at 15.
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In addition to plaguing the federal
courts, the double jeopardy issue
has wreaked havoc with the states'
efforts to perform their traditional
role in prosecuting crime and regulating civil activity. In a friend-ofthe-court brief submitted on behalf
of 48 state attorneys general, it is
argued that double jeopardy issues,
as analyzed in the two cases being
reviewed here, extend far beyond
the civil forfeiture arena. The spectrum of impact includes claims that:
professional disciplinary actions bar
criminal prosecution and vice versa;
prison discipline for violent conduct
bars subsequent prosecution for
assault and homicide; disqualification from public health benefits
because of criminal conduct bars
subsequent criminal prosecution;
and challenges to the criminal prosecution of drunk driving charges
because of prior driver's license
suspensions for the same conduct.
In these consolidated cases, the
Supreme Court is asked to resolve
the double jeopardy dilemma.
ISSUES
1. Does the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibit criminal prosecution for
manufacturing marijuana because
the United States obtained a consent judgment in a civil forfeiture
action that sought forfeiture of property on the ground that it had been
used to facilitate drug activities?
2. Does the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibit a civil proceeding for the
forfeiture of property alleged to be
the proceeds of narcotics trafficking
and money laundering activity after
the owners of the property have
been prosecuted and convicted of
narcotics and money laundering
crimes?
FACTS
U.S. v. Ursery
The Michigan State Police executed
a search warrant and found 142
marijuana plants growing on land

just outside the boundaries of
respondent Guy Jerome Ursery's
property in Perry, Michigan. Inside
Ursery's house, the officers found
marijuana seeds, stems, and stalks,
two loaded firearms, and a grow
light. Subsequent evidence disclosed
that Ursery had been growing marijuana on his property and the land
adjoining it for at least three years.
On September 30, 1992, the United
States filed a civil action seeking
forfeiture of Ursery's real property
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994),
alleging that the property was used
to facilitate the unlawful posession
and distribution of marijuana. On
May 24, 1993, Ursery and his wife
settled the forfeiture action by
agreeing to pay $13,250 in lieu of
the forfeiture of the property.
In the meantime, on February 5,
1993, a federal grand jury returned
an indictment charging Ursery with
a single count of manufacturing
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). The indictment charged
that the manufacturing offense
occurred on July 30, 1992, the date
on which Michigan State Police
searched Ursery's property. After a
jury trial, Ursery was convicted and
sentenced to prison for 63 months.
After his conviction on the manufacturing charge, Ursery filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that the Double Jeopardy
Clause barred his criminal conviction following the civil forfeiture of
his property. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the
forfeiture proceeding was not an
"adjudication" because it was settled
by a consent judgment and that "the
forfeiture proceeding and criminal
conviction were 'part of a single,
coordinated prosecution of persons
involved in alleged criminal
activity."' (Quoting United States
v. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20).

Issue No. 7

A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit
reversed. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.
1995). The two-judge majority concluded that jeopardy had attached
in the civil forfeiture proceeding
because the "consent judgment in
the civil forfeiture action is
analogous to a guilty plea entered
pursuant to a plea agreement in a
criminal case." 59 F.3d at 571.
According to the Sixth Circuit
majority, jeopardy attaches in a civil
forfeiture action when the court
accepts the stipulation of forfeiture.
Relying on United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989), and Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801
(1993), the majority next held that
"any civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) constitutes punishment
for double jeopardy purposes." 59
F.3d at 573. The majority rejected
the United State's argument that
Ursery's criminal conviction and the
civil forfeiture of his property did
not constitute punishment for the
same offense within the meaning of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
majority reasoned that the criminal
offense is a species of the lesser
included offense of forfeiture,
explaining that "the criminal offense
is in essence subsumed by the forfeiture statute and thus does not
require an element of proof that is
not required by the forfeiture
action." 59 F.3d at 574.
Finally, while acknowledging that
the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not prohibit imposing multiple
punishments for the same offense in
a single proceeding, the court
declined to find that the parallel
civil forfeiture and criminal actions
constitute a "single, coordinated
proceeding" for double jeopardy
purposes, because the actions
proceeded before different judges
and because there was no
communication between the
lawyers assigned to the civil and
criminal proceedings.

U.S. v. $405,089.23
Respondents Charles Wesley Arlt
and James Wren were indicted on
various counts involving narcotics
trafficking and money laundering in
violation of federal law. A jury
convicted Arlt and Wren on all
counts, and they were sentenced
to lengthy prison terms.
Five days after indictment, the
United States filed a complaint
seeking civil forfeiture under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) of several hundred
thousand dollars of property, including currency, automobiles, vessels,
silver bars, and an aircraft. The
United States also sought forfeiture
of a corporation controlled by
respondent Art. By agreement of the
parties, litigation of the forfeiture
action was deferred during the pendency of the criminal prosecution.
After Arlt and Wren were convicted,
the United States sought summary
judgment in the parallel civil forfeiture action. (Refer to Glossary for
the definition of summary judgment.) The Government argued that
the property was forfeitable on two
independent grounds, first, as proceeds of illicit drug trafficking, and,
second, as property "involved in" or
"traceable to" properties involved in
money laundering.
The district court agreed, finding
that all of the assets were subject to
forfeiture as proceeds of illegal
narcotics activity. Alternatively,
the court held that, except, for the
silver bars, the property was subject
to forfeiture under the money
laundering theory.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the
forfeiture judgment, holding that the
forfeiture of the property constitutes
punishment for the same offenses
that had formed the basis for the
criminal convictions of Arlt and
Wren. The court advanced two prin-

cipal grounds for its holding. First,
the court posited that civil forfeiture and criminal prosecutions
constitute separate proceedings for
double jeopardy purposes. The
Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected
the "single, coordinated proceeding" theory formulated in United
States v. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20, and
embraced by the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. 18755 North
Bay Road, 13 F.3d at 1499. In the
Ninth Circuit's view, "we fail to see
how two separate actions, one civil
and one criminal, instituted at
different times, tried before
different fact finders, presided over
by different district judges, and
resolved by separate judgments,
constitutes the same proceeding.
33 F.3d at 1216. According to the
Ninth Circuit, "a forfeiture case
and a criminal prosecution would
constitute the same proceeding
only if they were brought in the
same indictment and tried at the
same time." 33 F.3d at 1216.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the
ruling in United States v. Tilley,
18 F.3d at 300, a case in which the
Fifth Circuit held that the forfeiture of drug proceeds is a remedial
sanction and not punishment. The
Ninth Circuit construed Austin,
113 S. Ct. at 2801, which held that
civil forfeiture of property used to
facilitate a drug crime constitutes
punishment and, accordingly, is
limited by the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
as mandating an abstract, categorical approach to determining
whether civil forfeiture is
punitive. The Ninth Circuit
declared: "Under Austin, in order
to determine whether a forfeiture
constitutes 'punishment,' we must
look to the entire scope of the
statute which the government
seeks to employ, rather than to the
characteristics of the specific
property the government seeks to
forfeit .... to determine whether a
(Continued on Page 328)
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forfeiture constitutes punishment.'"
33 F.3d at 1220.

ment for the purposes of double
jeopardy.

Under this categorical approach,
the Ninth Circuit emphasized that
it must look at the characteristics
of the forfeiture statute rather than
the characteristics of the property
forfeited. In examining, Section
881(a)(6) as a whole, the court
observed that the statute is not
limited to forfeiture of illicit proceeds, which arguably is remedial,
but, instead, encompasses all money
"furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange
of a controlled substance" as well
as to any money "used or intended
to be used to facilitate" a federal
drug felony.

Halper was criminally prosecuted
and convicted of violating the false
claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287
(1994), for submitting 65 inflated
Medicare claims that each charged
$12 per claim, for what was really a
$3 procedure. Halper was convicted
on all 65 counts and received a twoyear prison term and a $5,000 fine.

According to the Ninth Circuit,
"rather than rendering only the
profits of drug dealers subject to forfeiture, the statute applies to nearly
any money that is involved in a narcotics transaction in some fashion."
33 F.3d at 1221. Thus, the court
concluded that the forfeiture statute
does not serve solely a remedial
purpose, but, in the abstract, permits the imposition of punishment
which is barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The Supreme Court reviews the
decisions of the Sixth Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit, having granted
the Government's petition for a writ
of certiorari filed in each case. The
cases have been consolidated for
argument and decision. 116 S.Ct.
762 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
In concluding that civil forfeitures
always impose punishment, both
the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit relied principally on Haiper,
490 U.S. at 435, and Austin, 113 S.
Ct. at 2801. In Halper, the Supreme
Court, for the first time, held that a
civil penalty may constitute punish-
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Following conviction, the United
States brought a civil action against
Halper under the Civil False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994), seeking the statutory sanction of $2,000
for each of the 65 violations for
which Halper was convicted, an
amount equal to two hundred times
the Government's losses and the
costs of the civil action. Although
granting the Government's motion
for summary judgment on the issue
of liability, the district court concluded that the aggregate sanction
of $130,000 bore no "rational relation" to the Government's actual
harm. The district court ruled that
to impose this civil remedy would
constitute a second punishment in
violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. To avoid the constitutional
proscription, the district court
approximated the Government's
actual loss and expenses at $16,000
and entered summary judgment in
that amount.
The Supreme Court on review
framed the issue as whether in
"a particular case a civil penalty...
may be so extreme and so divorced
from the Government's damages and
expenses as to constitute punishment." 490 U.S. at 442. The Court
rejected the Government's argument
that the Double Jeopardy Clause is
limited to punishment meted out in
criminal proceedings, asserting that
the legislature's description of the
statute as either criminal or civil is
not dispositive of the issue. The

Court observed that civil proceedings have commonly been understood to advance both punitive as
well as remedial goals. Instead, the
determination of whether a civil
sanction constitutes punishment
requires an assessment of the penalty imposed and the purpose the
penalty may be said to serve.
The Court stated that it would
consider a civil penalty punishment
if aimed at the traditional goals of
punishment such as retribution and
deterrence. Thus, the Court held
that "a civil sanction that cannot be
said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be
explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes is
punishment, as we have come to
understand the term." Halper, 490
U.S. at 448. According, to the Court
in Halper,the central inquiry is
whether the civil sanction bears a
"rational relation" to a remedial
purpose such as compensating the
Government for its losses. Thus, the
Court did not hold that a civil sanction may never be imposed following
a criminal prosecution based on the
same conduct. Instead, only those
civil sanctions that do not bear a
"rational relation" to a remedial
purpose are proscribed by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
Additionally, the Court in Halper
was concerned with preventing the
prosecution from pursuing a civil
remedy because it is dissatisfied
with the penalty imposed in the
criminal action and posited that
"when the Government already has
imposed a criminal penalty and
seeks to impose additional punishment in a second proceeding, the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects
against the possibility that the
Government is seeking the second
punishment because it is dissatisfied
with the sanction obtained in he first
proceeding." 490 U.S. at 451 n.10.

Issue No. 7

The scope of the Court's holding in
Halper is admittedly narrow. "What
we announce now is a rule for the
rare case, the case such as the one
before us, where a fixed-penalty
provision subjects a prolific but
small-gauge offender to a sanction
overwhelmingly disproportionate to
the damages he has caused." 490
U.S. at 449. Thus, under Halper the
issue of whether the civil sanction is
limited to that amount necessary to
compensate the Government for its
losses must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.
The second case relied on by the
courts below is Austin. 113 S. Ct. at
2801. In Austin, the Supreme Court
held that, at least as to 21 U.S.C. §§
881(a)(4) and (a)(7) involving
forfeiture of conveyances and real
property, civil forfeiture is punitive
and, as such, is limited by the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Unlike the decision in
Halper,Austin did not focus on the
individualized application of the
civil penalty in deciding if civil
forfeiture could be characterized as
remedial or punitive. Instead, the
Court considered the two statutory
provisions in the abstract and
concluded that forfeiture under
either of them is punitive.
The Austin Court distinguished
Halper, reasoning that "Halper
involved a small, fixed-penalty
provision, which 'in the ordinary
case ... can be said to do no more
than make the Government whole.'
The value of the conveyances and
real property forfeited under
Sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), on
the other hand, can vary so dramatically that any relationship between
the Government's actual cost and
the amount of the sanction is merely coincidental." 113 S. Ct. at 2812
n. 14. Consequently, the Court
adopted a categorical approach to
forfeiture under Sections 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7), finding that they always
impose punishment.
American Bar Association

The respondents in these cases read
Halper and Austin, in combination,
to require the conclusion that the forfeitures in question constitute impermissible punishment. They maintain
that Austin modified Halper and precludes a case-by-case analysis in
favor of a categorical approach. In
real property cases, the respondents
contend that Austin mandates a finding that forfeiture is punitive per se.
Because any relationship between the
actual costs incurred by the United
States in prosecuting and investigating a case and the value of the property sought to be forfeited is merely
coincidental, the rational relationship
requirement is not satisfied.
The United States counters by
arguing that the forfeiture of facilitating property in Ursery's case is
not punishment. Under Halper, the
issue whether a particular civil
sanction amounts to punishment
within the meaning of the Double
Jeopardy Clause turns on an analysis of the sanction's purposes. The
Government asserts that the proper
inquiry in multiple punishment
cases is whether, as applied in the
particular case, the sanction is rationally related to legitimate remedial
aims. Under the holding in Halper,a
dominant remedial purpose renders
a sanction nonpunitive, even if the
sanction could also be said, in some
respects, to act as a deterrent.
Applying Halper,the United States
maintains that the appropriate caseby-case inquiry in the context of
forfeitures of property used to facilitate narcotics crimes is whether the
nexus between the particular property and the crimes committed or
intended is so close that the forfeiture may be rationally related to
further one or more of the remedial
purposes that traditionally have justified the remedy, purposes such as
inducing owners to exercise all reasonable care in managing their prop-

erty; abating a nuisance or wrong;
and insuring indemnity to the
injured party. The last objective compensating an injured party extends as well to the Government
and should be applied to require
that each person whose property
contributes to the harms caused by
drug trafficking also contribute to
defraying the Government's costs
of enforcement and societal harms
created by that activity.
While the United States concedes
that some language in Halper may
be read to suggest that a civil sanction with any deterrent purpose
should be viewed as punishment,
the Government maintains that
such a formulation would sweep
too broadly. There are few, if any,
civil sanctions that do not serve, in
part, to deter. Thus, if Halperwere
construed to prohibit imposition of
a civil sanction that has any incidental or collateral deterrent effect,
every civil sanction would constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. This view would be
inconsistent with Halper's own
emphasis on the limited scope of
its ruling.
As for Austin, while not expressly
stating so, the United States seeks
to modify that decision insofar as it
holds that civil forfeiture of real
property and conveyances is
per se punitive. In other words,
the Government asks the Supreme
Court to limit the holding in Austin
to the extent that it deviates from
the case-by-case analysis required
in Halper.
On the issue of forfeiture of drug
proceeds, Arlt and Wren attempt to
move the Court in just the opposite
direction. They argue that the categorical approach applied in Austin
should be extended to encompass
drug proceeds. They repeat the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit that
because the statute authorizes for(Continued on Page 330)
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feiture of money furnished or
intended to be furnished by a person in exchange for a controlled
substance, the sanction is not solely
remedial (limited to forfeiture of
illicit proceeds) and, thus, constitutes punishment.
In these cases, respondents' argument elevates form over substance.
Even if the evidence clearly establishes that the money was entirely
derived from drug trafficking,
because the statute might in some
future case be applied to forfeit
funds merely intended to be used to
purchase drugs, that does not
necessarily mean that the statute as
a whole should be construed as
punitive.
The Government, on the other
hand, argues that Austin is not
controlling in forfeiture cases
involving drug proceeds. First, the
Government correctly states that
the holding in Austin was limited to
forfeiture of facilitating real property. The question of whether forfeiture of proceeds is punitive and,
thus, limited by the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment
was not before the Court.
Second, forfeiture of illicit proceeds
is a recent development in forfeiture
law; indeed, forfeiture of proceeds
was not authorized by statute until
1978. Thus, the Austin Court's
historical analysis of forfeitures as
being in part punitive is not applicable to forfeiture of drug proceeds.
The Government, however, omits
that Austin also looked to the
legislative history and to the statutory innocent owner defense (which
is also available in drug proceeds
cases) to support its conclusion that
forfeiture of facilitating property was
intended, at least in part, to punish.
This reasoning would be equally
applicable to the forfeiture of
drug proceeds.
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The stronger argument advanced by
the United States is that, unlike
facilitating property, there is a rational relationship between drug proceeds and the loss suffered by the
Government and society. As the
Seventh Circuit recently recognized,
"proceeds forfeitures can never be
out of proportion to the 'loss' suffered by the Government or society."
Smith v. United States, 1996 WL
72858, at 3. Moreover, when the
Government seeks forfeiture of
illegal profits, it does no more than
prevent unjust enrichment, a
plainly remedial goal.
The United States also argues that
forfeiture is not the same offense as
the crimes for which the respondents were prosecuted. As previously noted, the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits multiple punishments or successive prosecutions
only for the same offense. The test
for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy
purposes is the statutory elements
test set forth in Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932): "The applicable rule is that
where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test
to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does
not." Accordingly, if each statute at
issue "requires proof of a fact that
the other does not, the Blockburger
test is satisfied, notwithstanding a
substantial overlap in the proof
offered to establish the crimes."
lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770, 785 n.17 (1975).
The United States maintains that
if civil forfeiture amounts to an
offense that triggers double jeopardy
protections, the offense punished in
the forfeiture proceedings at issue is
not the same offense as any of the
criminal offenses on which respon-

dents were convicted. Each of the
forfeiture statutes requires proof
that each of the respondents' property played some role in the commission of the crime. For example,
Section 881(a)(6) authorizes forfeiture of money "furnished or intended to be furnished" in a drug trafficking crime. Similarly, Section
881(a)(7) requires proof that the
real property was "used, or intended
to be used" to commit a drug crime.
Each of the respondents was convicted of a drug or money laundering crime. Use of the forfeited
property is not an element of any
of these criminal offenses.
At the same time, each of the
criminal statutes requires proof of at
least one element not found in the
forfeiture statutes. For example,
conviction on the criminal charges
required proof that respondents participated in a conspiracy, possessed
a controlled substance with the
intent to distribute it, or engaged in
unlawful money laundering transactions. In contrast, a person can lose
his or her property under a judgment of forfeiture without having
been convicted of a crime.
Respondents counter by arguing that
the Double Jeopardy Clause also
precludes separate prosecution and
multiple punishments for the greater
and lesser-included offense. See
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
An offense is a lesser-included offense
of another if every violation of the
statute defining the greater offense
necessarily entails a violation of the
statute defining the lesser offense.
The respondents argue that the
forfeitures constitute "a species of
greater offenses with respect to the
lesser offenses that form the bases of
the forfeitures." United States v. One
1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37
F.3d 489, 495 (9th Cir. 1994).
The Government's argument breaks
down when the prosecution charges

Issue No. 7

a defendant with a particular
offense and then brings a subsequent forfeiture action based on
that same statutory crime. For
example, if a defendant is prosecuted for a single drug sale and later
that same drug transaction is relied
on to support forfeiture of the profits derived from the sale of drugs, in
order to prove that the money was
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance the prosecution
must prove the commission of the
underlying drug offense that generated the funds. While the standard
of proof in the forfeiture case is the
lesser civil standard, that does not
change the fact that in order to
prove the greater forfeiture offense,
the prosecution is required to prove
each and every element of the drug
offense.
Finally, the Government construes
the multiple punishments doctrine
as limited to protecting a defendant's legitimate "expectation of
finality in the original sentence."
United States v DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980). A proceeding is impermissibly successive
for purposes of the multiple punishment doctrine only when it is commenced after that expectation of
finality has ripened.
The United States reasons that
Halper specifically contemplated
that the government could seek
both civil and criminal penalties.
Since the respondents were well
aware that the Government intended to seek both criminal and civil
remedies that were basically
contemporaneous, they could not
reasonably have formed any expectation to the contrary. For that
reason, the facts do not implicate
Halper's basic concern that the
Government is seeking to disturb
an otherwise final criminal judgment because it is dissatisfied with
the criminal sentence received by
the defendant.

American Bar Association

SIGNIFICANCE
The current status of double jeopardy jurisprudence is muddled, to
say the least. Confusion in this area
has created a situation in which a
defendant in one jurisdiction may
escape criminal liability because of a
prior judgment of civil forfeiture,
while, in another jurisdiction, the
criminal and civil sanctions imposed
in separate proceedings based on the
same criminal offense may be permitted to stand. Furthermore, in the
case of a prior criminal prosecution,
some defendants may be permitted
to retain their ill-gotten gains while
other defendants must forfeit their
property to the government.
Moreover, it has become glaringly
apparent that the legal standards,
tests, principles, and doctrines that
have emerged from the long history
of Supreme Court cases on double
jeopardy have become so complex
as to become almost impossible to
apply in any consistent and
coherent manner.
Perhaps the time has come to give
up trying to reconcile these cases
and instead adopt a radically new
approach to the subject. These consolidated cases provide the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to do
just that.

ATTORNEYS OF THE
PARTIES
For the United States (Drew S.
Days, lII, Solicitor General;
Department of Justice;
(202) 514-2217).

AMICUS BRIEFS
In support of the United States
Joint brief of Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety and
Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(Counsel of Record: Henry M.
Jasny; Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety; (202) 408-1711);
Joint brief of Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.,
International Association of Chiefs
of Police, Inc., and the National
Sheriff's Association (Counsel of
Record: James P. Manak;
(708) 858-6392);
Joint brief of the State of
Connecticut and 47 other states,
joined by the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico (Counsel of Record:
Mary H. Lesser, Assistant State's
Attorney of the State of
Connecticut; (860) 258-5800);
Joint brief of the State's
Attorney of Cook County, Illinois,
and the National District Attorneys
Association, Inc. (Counsel of
Record: Renee Goldfarb, Assistant
State's Attorney of Cook County,
Illinois; (312) 443-5496);
Joint brief of the Counties of
San Bernardino, Alameda, San
Joaquin, and Kern, California
(Counsel of Record: Dee R.
Edgeworth; Deputy District
Attorney of San Bernardino
County, California;
(909) 387-6478);
Joint brief of 39 Counties of the
State of Washington (Counsel of
Record: Barbara A. Mack, Senior
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of
King County, Washington;
(206) 296-9010).

For Guy Jerome Ursery (Lawrence
Emery; (517) 337-4866).
For Charles Wesley Arlt (David
Michael; (415) 986-5571).
For James Wren (Jeffry K. Finer;
(509) 455-3700).
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